Who is the key campaigner?
Civil society organizations in the European Union

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Introduction

"I do not take my mandate from the European people." - alleged quote by Cecilia Malmström, current EU Trade Commissioner

Goals of **civil society organisations (CSOs)** in the European Union

- Hold politicians and bureaucrats accountable
- Represent stakeholders and citizens in consultations
- Advocate and lobby for nonprofit and charitable interests
- Provide expertise

⇒ CSOs form **interorganisational advocacy networks** in the pursuit of these goals

Research questions

1. Can civil society organisations learn from each other to lobby more successfully?
2. Which organisations are the most effective to represent civil society?

Advocacy outcome variables

European Commission (EC) is main target of lobbyists for its powerful ability to initiate legislative proposals

- Number of meetings with commissioners and their staff
- Number of seats in its expert groups
- Binary index 1 if one of both measures greater than 0

Network data

Extract profile sheets of civil society organisations from official **EU Transparency Register**

- Exploit each organisation's networking and members section with fuzzy search algorithms
- Match is coded as undirected link between two organisations
- Isolated nodes and dyads are dropped, focus on giant component
- Network relations are assumed to be permanent and stable
- Edges can be weighted by measuring overlap in policy interests



Theoretical underpinnings

Organisation i maximises its advocacy payoff defined in benefits and costs given its organisational network g (following Ballester and Zenou (2014))

$$\Pi_i(\mathbf{y}, g) = (a_i + \delta \sum_j g_{ij} y_j) y_i - \frac{1}{2} y_i^2 \qquad (1)$$

- With a_i being heterogeneity in advocacy productivity and g^*_{ij} an element of the row-normalized adjacency matrix $\mathbf{G}^*$

$$a_i = \mathbf{x_i}'\beta_1 + \sum_j g^*_{ij} \mathbf{x_j}'\beta_2 + \epsilon_i \qquad (2)$$

- **Nash equilibrium** of the model constitutes of

$$\mathbf{y}^{\mathsf{NE}} = (\mathbf{I}_n - \delta\mathbf{G})^{-1}\mathbf{a} \qquad (3)$$

- In equilibrium, efforts are partly determined by **Katz-Bonacich centralities** in $(\mathbf{I}_n - \delta\mathbf{G})^{-1}$ and covariates captured in $\mathbf{a}$

Empirical specification and identification

To estimate the parameters of the model the best response function from (1) is taken to the data

$$y_i = \delta \sum_j g_{ij} y_j + \mathbf{x_i}'\beta_1 + \sum_j g^*_{ij} \mathbf{x_j}'\beta_2 + \epsilon_i. \qquad (4)$$

- $\sum_j g^*_{ij} \mathbf{x_j}'\beta_2$ captures *contextual effects* from background variables of connected organisations
- Identify **Local-aggregate peer effect model** by using vector of degrees $\mathbf{G1_n}$ and (average) contextual variables of indirectly connected organisations $\mathbf{GG^*X}$ as instruments for endogenous peer effort $\mathbf{GY}$ (Liu et al., 2014)

Summary of findings

- Positive peer effects between partner organisations for lobbying the European Commission
- Gains from interdisciplinary partnerships are potentially stronger
- Peer learning beats money

Results

- 100% increase in number of meetings of connected organisations increases number of meetings with EC staff by 6% (model 1)
- Peer effect of expert group membership slightly larger with 9.5% (model 2)
- Complementarity might be stronger for interdisciplinary ties (model 4)

	meetings	expert groups	binary index	binary index weighted network
intercept	0.261***	0.048***	0.238***	0.236***
	(0.041)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.026)
staff	−0.001	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
EP badges	−0.022	−0.013**	−0.012	−0.013
	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)
expenditures	0.017***	0.002	0.008***	0.007***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
distance to Bxl	−0.001	−0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
contxt staff	−0.000	−0.000	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
contxt badges	0.012	0.000	0.005	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)
contxt expend	−0.004	−0.003**	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
contxt distance	−0.001	0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
peer meetings	0.059***			
	(0.013)			
peer expert groups		0.095***		
		(0.015)		
peer index			0.037***	
			(0.012)	
weighted peer index				0.045***
				(0.014)
Num. obs.	932	932	932	931

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

First stage F-statistic: 230.8 on 14 and 918 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Outcomes: meetings (log number meetings with EC officials), expert groups (log EC expert group appointments), binary index (1 if number meetings or expert group seats >1), binary index weighted network ($w_{ij} = \frac{interest\_overlaps_{ij}}{N\_possible\_overlaps_{ij}}$ for element in adjacency $(1 - w_{ij}/max(w_{ij})) * g_{ij}$)

Peer effects: peer meetings (sum log meetings connections), peer expert groups (sum log expert group seats connections), peer index (sum connections' indices), weighted peer index (peers' indices with weighted edges)

Explanatory variables: staff (number persons involved in advocacy), EP badges (number accredited persons with EP entry badge), expenditures (advocacy activity, in 100,000€), distance to bxl (distance to Brussels in 100kms), context staff (avg accredited persons of partner organisations), context badges (avg. number badges of connections), context distance (avg distance connections to Brussels)

Work in Progress

- Build panel
- Experiment with more advocacy outcomes
- Exogenous variation in outcomes e.g. environmental or humanitarian disasters
- Strength of ties: Membership (tight) - campaign partner (loose)

Finding key campaigners

Following Ballester et al's (2006) key player methodology

- Identify organisation *whose hypothetical loss from network leads to largest reduction in aggregate effort*
- Denote $\mathbf{y}^{[-i]}$ as aggregate effort without organisation i in network
- The **key campaigner** maximizes the difference

$$i^* = argmax_i \mathbf{1}'\mathbf{y} - \mathbf{1}'\mathbf{y}^{[-i]}. \qquad (5)$$

- Based on this difference Ballester and Zenou (2014) derive a **generalized intercentrality**

$$d_i = \mathbf{1}'\mathbf{M}(\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{a}^{[-i]}) + \frac{\sum_j m_{ij}(g,\delta) a_j^{[-i]} \sum_j m_{ji}(g,\delta)}{m_{ii}(g,\delta)}$$

effect of change in contextual vars

effect of change in network structure

- Where $(\mathbf{I}_n - \delta\mathbf{G})^{-1}$ is rewritten as matrix $\mathbf{M}$ with elements $m_{ij}(g,\delta)$

organisation	intercentrality	degree	betweenness /1000	rank
Climate Action Network Europe	3.47	36.00	61.14	1
Alliance for Rabies Control	1.67	39.00	79.90	2
Ruralit-Environnement-Dveloppement	1.43	32.00	49.81	3
ACP Civil Society Forum	1.33	30.00	52.78	4
Platform of European Social NGOs	1.06	23.00	53.01	5
European Federation for Intercultural Le	1.01	26.00	25.52	6
Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and E	0.89	1.00	0.00	7
International Alliance of Patients' Orga	0.79	19.00	17.99	8
Alliance for European Diabetes Research	0.77	21.00	24.39	9
European Public Health Alliance	0.77	19.00	16.33	10

Ranking of key campaigners based on binary index (Model 3)

Subsidising key campaigners

Allocate grants among 10 key organisations (darkblue) or 10 random organisations (lightblue)



Simulation of grant allocation with lobby meeting outcome (Model 1)

References

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